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ABSTRACT: On average, more than two people are killed or severely injured every day in Norway in 
road traffic. Hence, elements that benefit a decrease in this number will be welcomed, such as “Advanced 
Driver-Assist System” (ADAS) technology. However, increasing technology in cars might require new 
driving skills compared to those taught today and the transition to more and new technology could 
potentially increase the accident rate. In the safety industry, it is well known that training for new and 
more automated technology is important. This raises a question: How does the transition to new, more 
complex and more automated technology affect driver training and the education of driver instructors? 
At the present time, there are no clear answers to this question. However, it seems that there is a need for a 
discussion and potentially a redefinition on which driver skills should be required, and how to implement 
these skills. This is what we attempt to discuss in this paper.
(4) safer vehicles, (5) promote the use of modern 
technology to increase road safety, (6) improve 
emergency and post-injuries service, and (7) pro-
tect vulnerable road users (European Commission 
2010). Technological innovation is one of the seven 
strategies, in addition to improving education and 
training of road users. However, what we know 
from other industries regarding humans interre-
lating with increased automation (e.g., Lee 2006; 
Sætren and Laumann 2015), it is not a certainty 
that the numbers of killed and severely injured will 
continue to decrease with an increase in technolog-
ical solutions. Reasons such as lack of standardi-
sation in technological solutions, mode confusion, 
lack of situational awareness, overreliance, compla-
cency and so forth, could all be reasons why the 
interrelation between humans and technology have 
a possibility of not going according to plan (Young 
and Stanton 2007). One of the reasons is a lack of 
focus on training for automation (Sætren and Lau-
mann 2015). Regarding the technological develop-
ment in cars, new technology is implemented at a 
fast tempo, but little attention is given to training 
in using the technology to new and existing driv-
ers. Research shows for instance that only 24% 
of buyers were given instructions from the car 
dealer when cars with an “Advanced Driver-Assist 
System” (ADAS) were bought in The Netherlands 
(Harms and Dekker, 2017). Even less attention 
seems to be placed on teaching driver instructors 
how to teach driving skills with this vast variety of 
technology. In addition, we have found no litera-
ture on this topic from a pedagogy aspect. For this 
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2016, there were 135 road deaths in Norway. The 
number for 2015 was 117, and for 2014 it was 147. 
However, if  you include the number of accidents 
resulting in severe injuries, the number was 791 in 
2016, 810  in 2015, and 821  in 2014 (SSB 2018a). 
This means that, on average, more than two people 
are killed or severely injured every day due to traffic 
accidents in Norway. Compared to any other high-
risk sector, the number is high, but the trend over 
the past decades is that the number is decreasing. 
The Norwegian government bases the National 
Transport Plan (NTP) on a vision of zero. This 
vision means zero dead and zero severely injured in 
road traffic. The objective for this period of NTP 
(2014–2023) is to halve the number of road deaths 
and severe injuries, and that, in 2020, there should 
be no more than 775 killed and severely injured in 
road traffic in Norway, that is about two people per 
day on average. Strategies to achieve this objective 
in Norway are, for instance, to design safer roads, 
to encourage safer behaviour from road users, 
and to encourage the development of technology 
to produce safer vehicles (NTP 2014–2023). Nor-
way is not alone in such objectives as this is also 
in accordance with the EU objective, which is to 
halve the number of people killed in road traffic 
during the period 2010–2020 (European Commis-
sion 2015a). In order to achieve this, the EU has 
developed seven strategies: (1) improve education 
and training of road users, (2) Increase enforce-
ment of road rules, (3) safer road infrastructure, 
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reason, we would like to look at training for auto-
mation when it comes to driving cars.
How will ADAS technology in cars potentially affect 
driver training and driver instructor education, and 
which new skills might be needed for a driver?
In order to answer this, the driver training pro-
gram and the driver instructor education in Nor-
way will be presented first, before we present issues 
regarding automation and training. After this we 
discuss ADAS technology in cars and how it would 
affect driver training and driver instructor educa-
tion. Next, we look at which new skills a driver 
might need. Then, we present our conclusion.
2 DRIVER LEARNING PROGRAM AND 
DRIVER INSTRUCTOR EDUCATION 
IN NORWAY
The Norwegian driver education model is very 
comprehensive and systematic (Rismark and 
Sølvberg 2007) and it normally takes about two 
years to become a driver with the program which 
contains detailed curricula for content, progres-
sion, and teaching methods (NPRA 2013). This 
two-year education is a module based training 
program consisting of four modules that include 
both individual and group tutorials that are both 
theoretical and practical. In addition, accompa-
nied driving with someone who has had their driv-
ing license for a minimum of five years is highly 
recommended and thus it is common, from the age 
of sixteen to drive with a parent as a passenger.
Driver instructor education in Norway is also an 
extensive education as it is a two-year university 
education with an emphasis on traffic pedagogy, 
road traffic law, and traffic psychology in addition 
to physics and technology (Nord universitet 2017). 
This two-year education includes both theory and 
practice and emphasises operational, tactical and 
strategic driving skills (Michon 1985), and the 
GDE framework (Peräaho, et al. 2003). However, 
in the future we might see a reduced need for an 
extensive focus on these elements, which until now 
have been viewed as basic. As future in-car tech-
nology might replace some of the information 
retrieval, assessments and decisions previously 
made by the driver, we might see a shift in which 
are the knowledge and skills that are important for 
driving instructors to develop.
3 AUTOMATION AND TRAINING
There are a number of different systems, ranging 
from basics such as automatic windscreen wipers 
to more advanced technology such as lane depar-
ture tracking, automatic braking systems and even 
more enhanced levels of automated driving func-
tionality. Such systems are for instance autopilot 
(Tesla), distronic plus steering assist (Mercedes), 
and intellisafe (Volvo).
Increased automation in cars will probably lead 
to an eventual decrease in the numbers of acci-
dents (Elvik and Høye 2015; Wilmink et al. 2008). 
Some reports indicate that traffic fatalities could be 
reduced by as much as 90% (Bertanocelli and Wee 
2015). Further, levels of automation in cars will 
most probably increase as a result of the increased 
digitalisation of the transport sector, and brands 
such as Volvo, BMW, and Tesla, all popular brands 
in Norway, expect to have self-driving cars on the 
roads within the next five years (TechEmergence 
2017). However, it is expected that the leap from 
where we are today to all cars being self-driven, 
is remote, and that semi-automation with in-built 
ADAS technology seems to be a reality for some 
time to come, considering that age of the motor 
vehicle population in Norway in 2016 was, on 
average, 10.6 years (SSB 2018b). The number for 
Europe is 10.7 years (ACEA 2017).
There are several different taxonomies try-
ing to capture the essence of the development of 
advanced technology in cars, and the most com-
mon seems to be the SAE’s levels of automation 
(SAE 2014). This approach is based on six levels 
of automation ranging from “No automation” 
(level 0) to full automation (level 5). In levels 0–3 
the human driver has the responsibility for the driv-
ing, and in levels 4–5 the car takes on this respon-
sibility. Examples of technology at each level, 
according to Banks et  al. (2017) are for instance 
level 1: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), level 2: 
Tesla Autopilot, level 3: Audi A7 prototype, level 
4: Toyota Highway Teammate, and level 5: Google 
self  driving car. Today, most ADAS technology 
equipped cars are at level 1. Furthermore, seen 
from a drivers perspective (Banks and Stanton 
2017), there are different roles for the driver within 
automated systems. As an example, a Driver Driv-
ing (DD) is defined as an operator responsible for 
completing basic operational, tactical, and strate-
gic tasks (Michon 1985). However, the Driver Not 
Driving (DND) would expect an automated sys-
tem to have full control of these tasks. That being 
said, the transition is not straightforward, and dur-
ing the middle phases of automation, Driver Mon-
itoring (DM) should be assumed. A challenge is 
that in level 2 the driver operates the vehicle, which 
assumes a transition between DD and DM and in 
level 3 the driver, to a larger degree, supervises the 
vehicle but needs to intervene if  needed assuming 
a transition between DM and DND (Banks and 
Stanton 2017). The cars with the most advanced 
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driver assist systems will be additional to the many 
cars that have less advanced technological equip-
ment on the roads. However, this middle phase is, 
according to human factors and safety research, a 
phase where the human interference is relied upon, 
but the human is not very reliable (Wickens et al. 
2016; Son and Park 2017). Human interrelation-
ship with semi-automated technology is known to 
potentially result in serious unwanted incidents in 
a wide range of sectors such as petroleum (Sætren 
and Laumann 2015), aviation (Billings 1997; Par-
asuraman and Byrne 2003), and road transport 
(NTSB 2017). Research has found there are several 
causes for this, for instance the issue of trust, over-
reliance, or complacency (Sætren and Laumann 
2015; NTSB 2017), situational awareness (Kaber 
and Endsley 2007), mode confusion (NTSB 2014), 
or lack of optimal training (Salas et  al. 2006; 
Sætren and Laumann, 2015). Additionally, news 
items concerning ADAS technology in cars seems 
to share a common misperception that when more 
automation is introduced, human error will disap-
pear (e.g. NRK 2017). This gives rise to the idea 
that training is not necessarily needed. Human fac-
tors research advises against not training for the 
use of new complex technology (Lee 2006; Salas 
et al. 2006; Sætren and Laumann 2015), as there 
will always be a human in the technology loop, for 
instance in use, maintenance or design.
It might even be an issue that increased auto-
mation might increase the level of competence 
required for the operator, as an operator must 
know both how to handle the system more or less 
manually, for instance if  the sensors in a car turn 
off  due to bad weather, and additionally know how 
to handle and supervise the advanced technology.
So, as driving skills decrease, the need for poten-
tially taking over the car will occur in more difficult 
scenarios such as in bad weather conditions like 
slippery roads, heavy snow, and so forth, because 
such conditions could be difficult for ADAS tech-
nology to handle. One example is Adaptive Cruise 
Control (ACC). A driver who uses ACC, that 
works most of the time, does not get much train-
ing in driving without it. Then, when it is time for 
the driver to take over control, for instance because 
the weather conditions are too harsh for the sys-
tem to operate, the driver might lack optimal skills 
to handle the driving. Research has indicated that 
ACC technology leads to a reduction in mental 
workload and thus problems with regaining con-
trol of the vehicle in failure scenarios (Stanton 
and Young 1998). ACC is one of the technologies 
that might be turned off  in, for instance, heavy 
rain without advance warning, implying in that 
the driver must be skilled in handling bad weather 
conditions while driving, and be able to take con-
trol of the car straight away.
During a transition period where there will 
be cars on the roads with very little to no ADAS 
technology in combination with cars with a large 
variety of ADAS technology. There is the impor-
tant question of which skills should be taught in 
a driver training program and in driver instructor 
education. The introduction of more automation 
in cars will lead to a change in the skills needed for 
the driver, and hence will bring about a need for a 
change in the competence of the driver instructor. 
This, in turn, will probably affect driver instructor 
education.
4 AUTOMATED AND ADVANCED NEW 
TECHNOLOGY IN CARS IN REGARD 
TO DRIVER TRAINING AND DRIVER 
INSTRUCTOR EDUCATION
There are some obvious strengths regarding more 
automation in cars as opposed to fully manual 
cars. First of all, the workload will decrease for the 
human driver. With more technology taking over 
tasks such as changing gears, keeping the speed 
stable, avoiding collisions with pre-crash systems, 
navigation, and so forth, the driver can pay atten-
tion to other aspects. However, it is commonly 
known that when humans supervise a system as 
opposed to being an active participant, attention 
seem to fall (e.g. Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Even 
though there are many benefits such as the prob-
ability of a lower accident rate, there are also sev-
eral concerns regarding automation. Most of these 
concerns are about when the driver needs to take 
over a vehicle, for instance in critical conditions 
(Son and Park 2017) or intention to use/user resist-
ance (Kyriakidis, et  al. 2015; König and Neymar 
2017). When technology takes over many of the 
tasks, and works most of the time, driver skills will 
decrease. This is because maintaining skills with-
out practice is probably not possible. However, 
very little information exists on driver training 
in regard to how to learn to drive with new tech-
nology as a new driver, or driving cars with new 
technology as an experienced driver (Harms and 
Dekker 2017). The topic of learning to use the 
technology is not even mentioned when opportu-
nities and barriers on a societal level are considered 
(Fagnant and Kockelman 2015). However, the use 
of the technology on the market today, such as, 
for instance, lane assist and Adaptive Cruise Con-
trol (ACC) should perhaps be taught after proper 
driver skills are acquired. For instance, techni-
cal driving using lane assist could be perceived as 
uncomfortable as the technical reaction of the car 
is generally slower compared to a driver. When 
turning, for instance, the car is often too far out 
the curve before the turn is performed and this can 
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be repeated several times during the turn. If  this 
was the behaviour of a learner driver during a les-
son, the instructor would not have considered the 
technical driving skills to be adequate. This means 
that the driver must be skilled in order to under-
stand that the car’s behaviour is not adequate, 
and respond accordingly. The driver requires both 
good driver skills and an understanding of how 
the technology works, together with its advantages 
and limitations. On the other hand, technology 
such as lane assist could probably be of support in 
the event that an unexpected incident occurs and 
the driver loses control of the car. As single vehicle 
off  the road together with head-on accidents are 
the most frequent accidents with the highest death 
rate in Norway for the past decades (SSB 2018a), 
this technology could potentially save lives. How-
ever, perhaps, it should not be trusted for use on a 
regular basis. In driver instructor education today, 
the teaching is that when driver assistance systems 
take over, the driving is not optimal. Thus, the sys-
tems could be there as a backup, but not trustwor-
thy enough to be used regularly. The driver should 
drive the car. Furthermore, if  such systems are to 
be used while driving, there are other considera-
tions involved. For instance, regarding ACC, it is 
a technological system that perhaps works better 
in some driving conditions than in others. As an 
example, on icy roads, or in higher density traffic 
in a more complex driving environment, it might 
be a better solution to control speed manually. 
Making the correct decisions on when to use, and 
when not to use, technology while driving requires 
good driving skills.
Regarding driver instructor education and 
driver training, it seems that the introduction of 
ADAS technology requires that elements are added 
to the education and training rather than removed. 
Additionally, operating these technologies should 
perhaps be a larger part of driver training, driver 
testing, and hence driver instructor education.
Technology has always had an impact on the 
content of the Norwegian driver education cur-
ricula. For instance, driving on slippery roads has 
been a mandatory part of driver training in Nor-
way since 1975. In the early days, the learner driv-
ers were trained to manually adjust the brake pedal 
in different ways to minimise the braking distance, 
on ice and snow, as much as possible. After the 
ABS braking system was introduced and became 
common in most cars, the content of driver train-
ing on slippery roads changed and focused more 
on letting the learner drivers experience that the 
ABS system enabled them to brake as hard as 
they could and to simultaneously use the steer-
ing wheel to control the car (NPRA 1995; NPRA 
2005). However, the main difference between the 
ABS brakes transition and the present technologi-
cal transition, is that ABS brakes became common 
in many cars and used the same way of braking 
in all brands of car. The driver needed to change 
how to move the foot while braking, but the brakes 
were in the same place, the basic movement was 
the same, and most brands of car had the same 
system. Nowadays, new technological solutions 
such as ACC, are different in different makes of 
car where some brands for instance have a switch 
on the right side of the steering wheel, while others 
have a button on the front or on the left side of the 
steering wheel. This lack of standardisation could 
be confusing and hence could distract the driver. 
All kinds of different solutions such as these, and 
different software solutions in touchscreens in new 
cars may have as a result that it may not be as easy 
as previously to drive a car that the driver has not 
driven before, due to a wide variety of technologi-
cal solutions. It could be difficult to know which 
technological solutions are included in the car, 
and difficult to know how to use the technology. 
Currently, distractions for the driver are about to 
increase due to in-vehicle devices. This runs coun-
ter to the necessity of keeping an eye on road 
(Wickens et al. 2004).
There is a possibility that the answer to this is 
to have differentiated driving licenses and not a 
standardised license such as we are used to today, 
because technology in cars is too varied and 
unstandardised. It should be a matter for discus-
sion as to when cars are so different from each 
other that a standardised driving license is no 
longer good enough.
Increased technology has affected the train-
ing situation for a long time, and, in Norway, one 
example of an aspect that is in a transitional phase, 
is the trend that new cars are not equipped with 
manual gears. There are two important aspects to 
this situation. First, we see that the educational 
system does not keep up with the speed of tech-
nological development. Toyota for instance, sold 
more than 99% of new cars equipped with auto-
matic gears so far in 2017, in Norway (Korsvoll 
2017). Thus, the driver will not need to learn how 
to use manual gears as automatic gears will most 
probably become the new normal. However, in 
Norway, driver training is based on manual gears, 
and the education of driver instructors is based on 
vehicles equipped with manual gears. Perhaps the 
driver instructor program should focus instead on 
other tasks rather than teaching new drivers how 
to drive with manual gears. If  a technology as basic 
as gears is hard to keep up with regarding a transi-
tion from manual to more automation, it could be 
a challenge when now even more technologically 
equipped cars enter the market.
Second, the gearing system is an example where 
different technological equipment in cars requires 
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different types of license for the driver. In Norway, 
as in the EU, you are allowed to drive an automatic 
car if  your license is for manual gears, but not the 
other way around. You are not allowed to drive a 
car with manual gears if  your license is for auto-
matic driving (FOR 2017). For this reason, many 
driving schools only have manual gears in their 
cars, as for instance learner drivers know that they 
will probably buy a cheaper car with manual gears 
when they have their license. A solution such as 
this might also include more ADAS technology in 
the years to come. There could be different licenses 
based on the technology in the car you drive.
The rapid speed of introducing new technology 
seems to be happening faster than the changes in 
the educational system. Furthermore, if  you have 
received your class B driving license, there is no re-
testing or system to update your driving skills, so 
there is a question as to how these drivers should 
learn how to operate new technology properly. 
Additionally, for driver instructors who are already 
authorised, there are no mandatory courses for 
updating their competence, so another question 
could be how they should get the necessary skills 
to teach new and existing learner drivers. If  the 
two-year university education to become a driver 
instructor in Norway adjusts today, the market will 
not change completely for many years. Neverthe-
less, the rapid speed of technological progress will 
continue.
5 NEW DRIVER SKILLS REQUIREMENTS
In order to know which skills a driver must have, 
we need to know how the car works. For example, 
the GDE matrix has been the basic understanding 
of the driving skills that is necessary for a driver 
to have and thus, one of the central elements in 
the driver instructor education. The GDE-matrix 
consists of five levels, where the lowest level is 
vehicle manoeuvring, the second level is mastering 
traffic situations, the third level is goals and con-
text of driving, the fourth level is goals for life and 
skills for living (Keskinen 1996  in Hatakka et al. 
2002), and the fifth level is social skills (Keskinen 
2014; Keskinen et  al. 2010). However, the situa-
tion regarding new technology in the car is also 
changing the skills needed for a driver. It seems 
to be time to redefine which competence a driver 
must hold, and the GDE matrix may not be the 
optimal way to define the necessary skills in the 
future. If  cars become more or less self-driving and 
automated, perhaps the lower stages of the GDE 
matrix might not correspond with the actual skills 
that are needed to drive a car.
Another example is the driving process, which 
might be explained using a basic information 
processing model (e.g. Wickens and Carswell 2006). 
This model assumes that information is perceived, 
then processed before decisions are made based on 
how the information is processed and action is then 
taken. In regard to the driving process, the ques-
tion is who is collecting the information and who 
is responsible for collecting which information, the 
car or the human? As an example, when driving 
with ACC, the driver needs to monitor the envi-
ronment and collect information on driving condi-
tions as the car does not collect information, for 
instance, on the road conditions such as rain or ice 
or dry asphalt. Furthermore, the system does not 
correspond with any other systems in the car, so, 
for instance, if  the car skids and the traction gets 
the car back on track, the ACC does not take the 
slippery road condition into consideration, and 
will only work to get the car back to the required 
speed or distance from the car in front. This 
assumes Driver Driving and Driver Monitoring 
with this technology (Banks and Stanton 2017). 
Regarding another technology, lane assist, the 
same aspect occurs as, for instance, lane assist will 
not work without proper road markings. Therefore 
the driver must pay attention to whether the road 
is properly marked or not. This is information a 
driver normally would not need to pay that much 
attention to if  driving the car, as the driver would 
most likely hold the steering wheel and stay on her/
his side of the road regardless of the quality of the 
road marks. The technology could thus make the 
driver pay attention to the road closer to the vehi-
cle rather than paying attention to the road traffic 
environment further ahead. Additionally, regard-
ing decision making, it could be questioned as to 
whether it is the car or the driver that makes the 
decisions. For instance, with ACC, if  the car does 
not collect information on the road conditions, 
it cannot be responsible for making decisions in 
this regard. The driver must monitor and make 
decisions based on the information gathered and 
processed. Finally, the question is who takes action 
based on the information and decisions? If  the car 
does not make decisions or gather relevant infor-
mation, it probably cannot take appropriate action, 
meaning this would be the driver’s responsibility.
So, what do we hand over to the car and what is 
left to the driver? The question will have different 
answers for different technologies. If, for instance, 
using the same scenario as with the ADAS tech-
nology, adaptive lighting, there is a different situ-
ation. Here the car gathers information on for 
instance the light conditions in the environment, 
and oncoming cars, and makes decisions based on 
the information gathered and takes action to turn 
lights on or off  or chooses the degree of bright-
ness. Thus, the driver will not need to use as much 
cognitive capacity for this operation.
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Another issue that complicates which driv-
ing skills are needed is the lack of standardisa-
tion between the car manufacturers on how the 
new technology should interact with the driver. 
For instance, there are several different solutions 
to touchscreen software in cars. So, the skills of 
the driver need to correspond to the actual car the 
driver will be driving, the technological solutions 
in the car and how the technological solutions 
interact with the driver.
It seems that training needs adjustment in 
order to meet the new digitalisation of the future. 
However, in order to change what we teach to the 
learner drivers, we probably need to start with the 
educational institutions who educate the driver 
instructors. In addition, there is the question of 
if  and how to re-educate driver instructors who 
are already certified as driver instructors for tra-
ditional driving. In Norway alone, there are more 
than 1,000 driving schools, and providing courses 
for the instructors in all of these schools will take 
time and effort. This time does not seem to be 
available at the speed at which changes are hap-
pening today.
One solution could be that the manufactur-
ers are responsible for the specific technological 
training for drivers, and license drivers for their 
technology. A solution such as this also requires 
consideration as to what training and testing for 
such a license should involve, in addition to who 
is responsible for the training and testing. Today it 
is the National Road Authorities in Norway who 
conduct the testing of learner drivers in order for 
them to qualify for a driving license. Therefore, to 
maintain the driver skills requirements, the test-
ing could be the responsibility of the authorities. 
This testing could include drivers ability to drive 
and supervise the systems in addition to how to 
respond to alarms and warnings. Therefore, one 
could think of driver education that comes in two 
levels. In that case, a standard learner driver could 
learn how to handle a manual car as level one in 
a standard driving school, but also learn how to 
operate and supervise a car of the future as level 
two. How to drive a car with technological solu-
tions could, with this system, be up to the manu-
facturers to teach properly to all drivers, and be 
tested by the road authorities.
We see in aviation, for instance, that pilots 
are trained in simulators in order to uphold the 
required skill level to fly an aircraft. This is partly 
because flying with a high level of automation 
decreases flying skills. This could be a solution 
for drivers as well. In order to keep their driving 
license, drivers could be required to have a certain 
amount of simulator training in order to uphold 
driving skills because their cars have ADAS tech-
nology. However, this will require an increase in 
simulators for one, and in Norway today there 
are between 5–10 simulators for driving license B. 
Furthermore, retraining to uphold skills requires a 
system where everyone holding a driving license in 
Norway has training. A system will also be needed 
to deal with the bureaucratic aspects. Thus, there 
are some obvious obstacles to such a solution in 
regard to costs and resources in addition to the 
issue of how society would respond to it and if  
there will be public acceptance for such a system, 
and the political will to implement it.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
How will ADAS technology in cars potentially 
affect driver training and driver instructor educa-
tion and which new skills might be needed for a 
driver? This was the question we wanted to exam-
ine closely in this paper.
We must be honest and admit that today, we 
do not know how to provide general training for 
more technology equipped cars, or even for self-
driving cars. To be able to assess a good training 
program, it is essential that we know what we are 
training for. Today, however, with the vast variety 
of technological solutions on the roads, the lack 
of standardisation of the software and devices in 
cars, in addition to a future which seems to have 
new technological solutions happening quickly, it 
seems difficult for the driver instructor industry to 
prepare and come up with an optimal solution in 
the short run.
Hence, we recommend that the content of driver 
training and driver instructor education should 
preferably be increased, not decreased, as good 
driving skills are still needed in addition to good 
understanding on how to operate the technology. 
This is because, as of today, ADAS technology in 
cars seems to result in more rather than less work 
for the driver.
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